Inheritance Wars: The Farmer With Dementia, the Son Who Died — and the 58 Acres That Changed Hands

Evan Richard Hughes was a farmer on Anglesey. He had three children: Gareth, Carys and Elfed.

For years the family's understanding was relatively straightforward. Gareth and Carys would receive the family company's shares. Elfed would receive the farmland.

Then Elfed died by suicide in 2015. Evan was already experiencing memory problems. Within months he began making a new will, and the 58-acre Yr Efail changed destination: it was now left to Gareth.

The family found itself fighting on two fronts. Did Evan have capacity to make the new will? And, even if he did, had he already promised the land to Elfed?

Family farm → son expected to inherit → son dies → father changes will → 58 acres go elsewhere → capacity dispute + promise dispute.

The family and the farming assets

Evan owned substantial assets including his bungalow Arfryn, approximately 79 acres at Bwchanan, approximately 58 acres at Yr Efail, the cottage Derwyddfa, livestock and about £290,000 in the bank. The Court of Appeal recorded an estate worth approximately £1,976,463 before tax.

Elfed was survived by his widow Gwen and their sons. His death is central to the changed family circumstances and the later will; it should not be sensationalised.

The will was only part of the succession story

Each child had received substantial lifetime benefits. Elfed received the farmhouse and approximately 17 acres at Bwchanan. Gareth and Carys each received plots on which to build homes. After Gareth's first home was transferred to his former wife in 2008, Evan gave him another house, which was rented at the date of trial.

The longstanding plan

The 1990 will left company shares to Gareth and Carys and farmland to Elfed. After Evan divorced his second wife, his 2005 will broadly retained that succession plan: company shares to Gareth and Carys, farmland to Elfed, Arfryn and its contents to Carys, and residue equally among the three children.

Then Elfed died. Sometimes a will changes because the family has changed. The difficult question is whether the new will reflects the testator's capable decision.

Evan's memory problems

By 2014 Evan was experiencing memory difficulties. The evidence included lost keys, farm gates left open, confusion about the time of day, erratic driving, a failure to recognise a cousin, confusion about livestock terminology and confusion about fields.

Those incidents were relevant evidence. They did not themselves prove incapacity. Cognitive impairment and testamentary capacity are not the same thing.

The new solicitor and the major change

In March 2016 Evan saw Manon Roberts, a solicitor who had not acted for him before. Gareth took him to the meeting and Evan's companion Florence Jones was present. Ms Roberts did not initially have the 2005 will.

The proposed will left Yr Efail to Gareth. The remaining farmland was held for Gwen during her lifetime and then for Elfed's three sons equally. Derwyddfa went to Carys, and residue was divided between Evan's eight grandchildren.

The final will was executed on 7 July 2016.

The promise problem

The first-instance judge found a longstanding understanding between Evan and Elfed concerning the land. After Elfed's death, evidence remained that Evan regarded the land as intended for Elfed's family. In March 2016 his accountant recorded a conversation in which Evan expressed the view that Elfed's family deserved the land. There was also evidence that Evan regarded selling farmland as disrespectful to Elfed and his family after capital-gains-tax implications were explained.

Medical assessment

Evan was assessed by Dr Pritchard. Later expert evidence from Professor Hugh Series was also considered. Cognitive testing indicated significant impairment and the evidence pointed towards vascular dementia. But it did not yield the simple equation “dementia equals no testamentary capacity”. The evidence surrounding the particular decision still had to be examined.

Dementia is evidence. It is not automatically the answer to testamentary capacity.

The first trial

HHJ Jarman QC held that Evan lacked testamentary capacity when the July 2016 will was executed. The 2016 will was rejected and the 2005 will admitted to probate. In the alternative proprietary-estoppel case, he made findings in substance that relevant representations and reliance had been established.

The Court of Appeal

The appeal was heard by Lord Justice Moylan, Lady Justice Asplin and Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing. Asplin LJ gave the leading judgment.

The court held that insufficient weight had been given to the independent solicitor, the contemporaneous medical practitioner and the expert evidence, while too much focus had been placed on the change concerning Yr Efail. Evidence from an experienced independent lawyer who understands the capacity requirements can carry very considerable weight, but it is not definitive.

An apparently unfair, ungrateful, capricious or disappointing will is not for that reason invalid. A will does not have to be fair to be valid.

The incapacity finding was set aside. The 2016 will was valid and was admitted to probate.

Simplified visual explainer

The case timeline

1. 1

   1990 — company shares to Gareth and Carys; farmland to Elfed

2. 2

   2005 — the broad succession plan is retained after Evan's divorce

3. 3

   From about 2014 — Evan experiences memory difficulties

4. 4

   2015 — Elfed dies by suicide; the family circumstances fundamentally change

5. 5

   March 2016 — Evan instructs a new solicitor, Manon Roberts

6. 6

   7 July 2016 — the new will is executed; Yr Efail is left to Gareth

7. 7

   2021 — HHJ Jarman QC finds that Evan lacked capacity; the 2005 will is admitted

8. 8

   24 March 2022 — the Court of Appeal reverses the capacity finding and admits the 2016 will

9. 9

   Representations and reliance preserved; detriment and remedy remitted

The will won. The land dispute didn't.

Even though the will was valid, Elfed's widow and sons still relied on proprietary estoppel. Their case was that Evan had promised the farmland to Elfed, Elfed had relied on it and acted to his detriment, and the later will could not simply defeat the equity which resulted.

Elfed had worked with and maintained his father's livestock for approximately 38 years. He bought adjoining farmland so the farms could be worked together, built a bridge connecting the land and constructed a large cattle shed used in the farming operation.

Why this is a perfect mediation case study

The Court of Appeal allowed the proprietary-estoppel issue to continue. Findings about representations and reliance were preserved. Detriment and remedy were remitted for determination by a different judge. This article does not speculate about the eventual result.

Three farm disputes, three lessons

In Thorner v Major, oblique assurances and nearly 30 years' unpaid work were enough for proprietary estoppel. In Hughes, a longstanding understanding and 38 years of work meant estoppel remained live even after the later will was upheld.

In James v James, a reasonable expectation was not enough because no sufficiently clear assurance was established. Expectation failed there; findings of representations and reliance survived here.

Bond v Webster also involved an elderly testator, cognitive concerns, a professionally drafted later will and a significant change. But its later will failed. Capacity cases turn on evidence, not labels.

The Golden Rule

Where an elderly or seriously ill testator makes a significant will, particularly where capacity may later be questioned, appropriate contemporaneous medical evidence can be important good professional practice. But a medical assessment is evidence; it does not make a will unchallengeable. Failure to follow the Golden Rule does not automatically invalidate a will.

See Banks v Goodfellow, Clitheroe v Bond, Bond v Webster and James v James.

Could it have been mediated?

Gareth's success on capacity did not resolve the dispute about Yr Efail. A mediation could not compel agreement, but it could have separated the legal question about the will from the practical question of the farm: whether Yr Efail should pass to Elfed's family; whether land could be divided; whether farming rights, a long lease, buyout, sale, trust arrangement or other estate assets could balance the settlement.

A judge ultimately determines legal rights. A family mediation can explore what combination of assets might actually end the dispute.

A new will does not always wipe the slate clean

Changing a will changes testamentary gifts. It does not necessarily extinguish existing trusts, contracts, proprietary-estoppel equities, co-ownership interests or other lifetime rights.

If you have promised somebody the farm for 30 years, a new will may not be the end of the story.

The practical lesson is explored further in How Not to Start an Inheritance War.

The 58 acres that wouldn't go away

Evan changed his will after his son's death. His circumstances had fundamentally changed. He also had cognitive impairment, but impairment was not the same as testamentary incapacity. The Court of Appeal held that the 2016 will was valid.

Gareth won the will dispute. Yet the farmland had a history reaching much further back. For decades Elfed had worked in the expectation that it would ultimately come to him, and the proprietary-estoppel issue survived.

The will may be valid. The family may still have a claim.

Sometimes the will is only the last document in a story that started decades earlier.

Related content

• Thorner v Major — the oblique farm promise
• James v James — when expecting the farm was not enough
• Winter v Winter — promises and the family business
• Bond v Webster — capacity and a later will
• Clitheroe v Bond — delusions and capacity
• Banks v Goodfellow — the capacity test
• How Not to Start an Inheritance War
• The Inheritance Wars hub

This article provides general commentary on Hughes v Pritchard and inheritance disputes in England and Wales. It does not constitute legal advice.