Inheritance Wars From the Archives: The Man Who Saw Devils — But Was Still Sane Enough to Make a Will

John Banks believed that devils were pursuing him.

He believed evil spirits were visibly present.

And he believed that a man named Featherstone Alexander was persecuting and molesting him.

There was one particularly significant problem with that last belief.

Featherstone Alexander was dead.

Banks had previously been confined in a lunatic asylum. There was no real dispute that he suffered from serious mental illness and persistent delusions.

Yet in December 1863 he made a will leaving his property to his young niece, Margaret Goodfellow.

After his death, the will was challenged.

Surely, it was argued, a man suffering delusions of this kind could not possess the mental capacity required to make a valid will?

The Court of Queen’s Bench disagreed.

The resulting decision was Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549.

More than 150 years later, lawyers and judges still begin with the test developed in this extraordinary Victorian inheritance dispute when deciding whether somebody had testamentary capacity.

The question was not simply: “Was John Banks insane?”

The much more important question was:

“Did his illness affect the will he actually made?”

A Victorian inheritance war

John Banks had experienced serious mental illness for many years.

As far back as 1841 he had been confined in the county lunatic asylum.

After his discharge he continued to experience fixed delusions.

One concerned Featherstone Alexander. Banks had developed an intense aversion towards him. Even after Alexander died, Banks continued to believe that he pursued and molested him. The mere mention of Alexander’s name could provoke violent excitement.

Banks also believed that he was pursued by devils or evil spirits which were visibly present to him.

These were not simply eccentric opinions. They were genuine delusions.

And yet that did not necessarily answer the legal question.

Margaret Goodfellow

Banks had an only sister of the whole blood. She had died before the will was made.

Her only child was Margaret Goodfellow.

Margaret lived with her uncle. She was his niece and, at the relevant time, his heir at law. Banks was attached to her.

In December 1863 he gave instructions for a will leaving his property to Margaret. The formal will was then executed later that month. It left his real and personal property to her absolutely.

On its face, there was nothing particularly irrational about the disposition. A childless uncle had left his property to the niece who lived with him and was the daughter of his deceased sister.

But Banks’s mental illness created the problem.

Banks dies

John Banks died unmarried on 28 July 1865. Margaret survived him.

But then something happened which transformed the inheritance position.

Margaret herself died in 1867. She was still young, unmarried and intestate.

The property which had passed from Banks to Margaret would therefore pass onwards according to her own intestacy. That meant it could ultimately reach somebody who was not a blood relative of John Banks.

Other members of the Banks family now had a powerful financial reason to question the will.

The will is challenged

The validity of Banks’s will was challenged on the basis that he had lacked testamentary capacity.

The argument had obvious force. Here was a man who had:

• previously been confined in an asylum;
• continued to suffer fixed delusions;
• believed himself persecuted by a dead man; and
• believed devils were physically pursuing him.

How could such a person be described as possessing a “sound mind”?

That question ultimately required the court to confront a much deeper issue: does mental illness automatically mean that someone cannot make a will?

The answer was no

The Court of Queen’s Bench rejected the proposition that any mental disorder automatically destroys testamentary capacity.

A person’s mind could be disordered in one respect while remaining capable of rational decision-making in another. The critical issue was whether the disorder affected the testamentary decision.

Banks’s delusions about Featherstone Alexander and evil spirits were extraordinary. But there was no sufficient connection between those delusions and his decision to leave his property to Margaret.

The will was therefore upheld.

The test that survived for 150 years

The test

The Banks v Goodfellow test

1. 1

   Do they understand what a will is?

   The person must understand the nature of making a will and its effect.

2. 2

   Do they understand, in broad terms, what they own?

   The person must understand the extent of the property being disposed of. This does not mean remembering every bank account or knowing every precise valuation.

3. 3

   Do they understand who might expect to benefit?

   The person must be capable of comprehending and appreciating the claims of those whom they ought to consider.

4. 4

   Is the decision being distorted by a disorder or delusion?

   A disorder of the mind or delusion must not influence the testamentary disposition in a way which causes a disposition that would not otherwise have been made.

A simplified summary of the common-law test, not legal advice.

You can be ill and still have capacity

This is perhaps the most important principle to emerge from the case.

Capacity is not determined by a label. A diagnosis does not automatically decide it.

Neither does old age; eccentricity; forgetfulness; physical illness; mental illness; or the existence of some irrational beliefs.

The legal question is functional. Did this person possess the necessary capacity for this particular testamentary decision?

And, where delusions exist: did the delusion affect the will?

Simplified visual explainer

The delusion test

1. 1

   Mental disorder

2. 2

   Does it affect testamentary capacity?

3. 3

   Does a delusion influence the disposition?

4. 4

   No

5. 5

   The existence of the delusion does not by itself invalidate the will

This is a simplified explanation of Banks v Goodfellow rather than legal advice. Individual circumstances require legal advice.

A man can see devils and still make a valid will

That is what makes Banks v Goodfellow so memorable.

The court did not decide that Banks was mentally well. Plainly he was not.

Nor did it decide that his beliefs about Featherstone Alexander and evil spirits were rational. Plainly they were not.

It decided that those delusions did not determine whom he chose to benefit. His decision to leave his property to Margaret was understandable independently of them.

That distinction became the foundation of modern testamentary-capacity law.

What if the delusion had involved Margaret?

Suppose Banks had believed: “Margaret is trying to poison me.”

And suppose that belief was entirely delusional.

If he had then excluded Margaret from his will because of that delusion, the position could have been very different. The mental disorder would then have had a direct connection with the testamentary disposition.

That illustrates why the existence of a delusion is not necessarily enough. The question is whether the delusion caused or influenced the will.

From Banks to Clitheroe: 1870 → 2020

Banks v Goodfellow — the man who believed devils pursued him.

↓ 150 years ↓

Clitheroe v Bond — the mother whose beliefs about her daughter included alleged thefts of a gold watch, cameras, a computer, Harry Potter books and other property.

In Banks, the delusions did not affect the relevant testamentary disposition. In Clitheroe, the court concluded that the relevant beliefs were legally significant to the dispositions under challenge.

Read: The Harry Potter Books, the Disinherited Daughter and the £350,000 Estate

The test in action — 154 years later

In Bond v Webster [2024] EWHC 1972 (Ch), the High Court again had to consider whether an elderly testator possessed testamentary capacity to make a radically different will involving valuable family business interests.

The legal framework still began with Banks v Goodfellow.

Read Inheritance Wars No. 10 — Bond v Webster

See also our specialist page on contested wills and testamentary capacity.

Would the result be different today?

The language used to describe mental illness has changed enormously since 1870. Medical understanding has changed. Society’s attitudes have changed.

The evidential material available to a modern court may include detailed medical records, specialist psychiatric evidence, video evidence and extensive professional files.

But the central legal insight in Banks remains remarkably modern.

A person should not lose the ability to decide who receives their property merely because they have a mental disorder. The question remains whether they possess the capacity required for the particular decision and whether a disorder or delusion improperly affects that decision.

That principle explains why Banks v Goodfellow remains so important.

Could it have been mediated?

Perhaps.

But this case illustrates an important distinction.

The proceedings raised a genuine question about whether the will was legally valid. Sometimes families need a court to answer such a question.

A mediator could not declare John Banks’s will valid or invalid. But the family did not necessarily need a judicial determination in order to agree what happened to the property.

The parties could have assessed:

• the evidence of Banks’s mental illness;
• the apparently rational nature of the gift to Margaret;
• the relationship between Banks and his niece;
• the absence of any obvious connection between his delusions and the gift;
• the costs and uncertainty of litigation; and
• the consequences if either side lost.

The absent witness — 1870 edition

There is a striking continuity between Banks and the modern Inheritance Wars cases.

John Banks was dead.

He could not explain his relationship with Margaret. He could not explain why he wanted her to inherit. He could not answer questions about Featherstone Alexander. He could not explain what his extraordinary experiences meant to him.

The court had to reconstruct his testamentary decision from the evidence left behind.

More than 150 years later, courts deciding contested probate cases face exactly the same fundamental problem: the person whose mind everybody is trying to understand is no longer there.

The same difficulty runs through Rea v Rea and Crew v Oakley.

The legacy of Banks v Goodfellow

John Banks could never have known what his family dispute would become.

He was not a great landowner. He was not a famous politician. He was not a judge or lawyer.

He was a Victorian man living with serious mental illness who wanted his niece to inherit his property.

Yet the challenge to his will produced one of the most enduring principles in English succession law.

The remarkable proposition established by the case can be expressed simply: mental illness is not the same thing as testamentary incapacity.

And perhaps the most memorable way to understand it is this:

John Banks believed he was pursued by devils. He was still capable of deciding who should inherit his property.

That distinction has survived for more than 150 years.

A dispute about testamentary capacity?

ProMediate Inheritance, Probate & Trusts provides specialist mediation for disputes involving testamentary capacity, contested wills, knowledge and approval, undue influence, executors and beneficiaries.

Mediation can take place before proceedings or at any stage of contentious probate litigation.

Discuss a Mediation · Meet Our Mediators

Next from the Archives

The fortune that inspired Bleak House?

Jennens v Jennens — a vast inheritance, generations of hopeful claimants and litigation which became synonymous with an estate being consumed by the fight over it.

Coming soon in the Inheritance Wars series.

This article provides general historical and legal commentary on Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 and mediation. It does not constitute legal advice.